Es ist paradox, daß es nur den Schlußantrag zu dieser Rechtssache auf Deutsch hat, das Urteil nicht.
Da die Printmedien aber darüber berichteten, daß der EuGH eine Vorratsdatenspeicherung für unzulässig erklärt hat, wird der EuGH dem Schlußantrag gefolgt sein.
SCHLUSSANTRÄGE DES GENERALANWALTS
MANUEL CAMPOS SÁNCHEZ-BORDONA
vom 15. Januar 2020(1)
Verbundene Rechtssachen C-511/18 und C-512/18http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=222263&pageIndex=0&doclang=de&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7751169mit der Aussage
V. Ergebnis
155. Nach alledem schlage ich dem Gerichtshof vor, dem Conseil d’État (Staatsrat, Frankreich) wie folgt zu antworten:
Art. 15 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2002/58/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 12. Juli 2002 über die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und den Schutz der Privatsphäre in der elektronischen Kommunikation (Datenschutzrichtlinie für elektronische Kommunikation) in Verbindung mit den Art. 7, 8, 11 und 52 Abs. 1 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union ist dahin auszulegen, dass er
1. nationalen Vorschriften entgegensteht, die in einem durch ernste und anhaltende Bedrohungen der nationalen Sicherheit, insbesondere durch die Gefahr des Terrorismus, gekennzeichneten Kontext den Betreibern und Anbietern elektronischer Kommunikationsdienste eine Pflicht zur allgemeinen und unterschiedslosen Speicherung von Verkehrs- und Standortdaten aller Teilnehmer sowie der Daten auferlegen, mit denen die Personen, die zur Schaffung der Inhalte der erbrachten Dienste beigetragen haben, identifiziert werden können;
2. nationalen Vorschriften entgegensteht, die nicht die Pflicht vorsehen, die betroffenen Personen über die Verarbeitung ihrer personenbezogenen Daten durch die zuständigen Behörden zu unterrichten, wenn diese Unterrichtung die behördlichen Maßnahmen nicht mehr beeinträchtigen kann;
3. nationalen Vorschriften, die die Sammlung von Verkehrs- und Standortdaten von Einzelpersonen in Echtzeit ermöglichen, dann nicht entgegensteht, wenn diese Maßnahmen nach den für den Zugang zu rechtmäßig gespeicherten personenbezogenen Daten festgelegten Verfahren und mit denselben Garantien ergriffen werden.
Das Urteil des EuGH in der englischen Sprachversion dazu hat es hier:
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
6 October 2020 (*)
Directive 95/46
Directive 97/66
Directive 2000/31
Directive 2002/21
Directive 2002/58
Regulation 2016/679
The disputes in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
Case C 511/18
Case C 512/18
Case C 520/18http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=232084&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7751169mit der Aussage
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, for the purposes laid down in Article 15(1), provide, as a preventive measure, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. By contrast, Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that:
– allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;
– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;
– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an Internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;
– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;
– allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,
provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.
2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which requires providers of electronic communications services to have recourse, first, to the automated analysis and real-time collection, inter alia, of traffic and location data and, second, to the real-time collection of technical data concerning the location of the terminal equipment used, where:
– recourse to automated analysis is limited to situations in which a Member State is facing a serious threat to national security which is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, and where recourse to such analysis may be the subject of an effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that a situation justifying that measure exists and that the conditions and safeguards that must be laid down are observed; and where
– recourse to the real-time collection of traffic and location data is limited to persons in respect of whom there is a valid reason to suspect that they are involved in one way or another in terrorist activities and is subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding in order to ensure that such real-time collection is authorised only within the limits of what is strictly necessary. In cases of duly justified urgency, the review must take place within a short time.
3. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), must be interpreted as not being applicable in the field of the protection of the confidentiality of communications and of natural persons as regards the processing of personal data in the context of information society services, such protection being governed by Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, or by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, as appropriate. Article 23(1) of Regulation 2016/679, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires that providers of access to online public communication services and hosting service providers retain, generally and indiscriminately, inter alia, personal data relating to those services.
4. A national court may not apply a provision of national law empowering it to limit the temporal effects of a declaration of illegality, which it is bound to make under that law, in respect of national legislation imposing on providers of electronic communications services – with a view to, inter alia, safeguarding national security and combating crime – an obligation requiring the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data that is incompatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 15(1), interpreted in the light of the principle of effectiveness, requires national criminal courts to disregard information and evidence obtained by means of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in breach of EU law, in the context of criminal proceedings against persons suspected of having committed criminal offences, where those persons are not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence and they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact.
Beispiele für aktuelle Artikel in der nationalen Presse, nicht abschließend, aber leider, mal wieder, ohne Aktenzeichen.
Pauschale Vorratsdatenspeicherung ist unzulässighttps://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/datenschutz-urteil-vom-eugh-pauschale-vorratsdatenspeicherung-ist-unzulaessig/26247996.htmlEtwas Vorrat darf seinhttps://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/urteil-zur-datenspeicherung-etwas-vorrat-darf-sein/26250570.htmlEdit "Bürger": Gesammelte Auswahl an Threads zu diesem Thema:
EuGH C-140/20 - Allgemeine Vorratsdatenspeicherung unzulässig
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=35999.0
EuGH C-793/19 - Allgemeine Vorratsdatenspeicherung ist unionsrechtswidrig
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=35775.0
EuGH C-793/19 (DSGVO) Anlasslose Vorratsdatenspeicherung unionsrechtswidrig
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=36479.0
EuGH C-511/18 - Vorratsdatenspeicherung unionsrechtswidrig
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=34364.0
Verfassungsgericht zweifelt an der Vorratsdatenspeicherung (01/2018)
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=25919.0
Oberverwaltungsgericht NRW > Vorratsdatenspeicherung ist europarechtswidrig (06/2017)
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=23507.0
EuGH: Vorratsdatenspeicherung rechtswidrig (12/2016)
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=21401.0
Vorratsdatenspeicherung: Europas Richter greifen durch (04/2014)
https://gez-boykott.de/Forum/index.php?topic=8960.0
Bei Verarbeitung pers.-bez.-Daten ist das Unionsgrundrecht unmittelbar bindend; (BVerfG 1 BvR 276/17 & BVerfG 1 BvR 16/13)
Keine Unterstützung für
- Amtsträger, die sich über europäische wie nationale Grundrechte hinwegsetzen oder dieses in ihrem Verantwortungsbereich bei ihren Mitarbeitern, (m/w/d), dulden;
- Parteien, der Mitglieder sich als Amtsträger über Grundrechte hinwegsetzen und wo die Partei dieses duldet;
- Gegner des Landes Brandenburg wie auch gesamt Europas;
Autor